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Notes 
WHEN STUFF BECOMES ART: THE 
PROTECTION OF CONTEMPORARY ART 




  The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA) grants an artist the 
broad power to “prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other 
modification of the work which would be prejudicial to [the artist’s] 
honor or reputation.” This right is significantly circumscribed, 
however, by VARA’s public-presentation exception, which states that a 
modification “which is the result . . . of the public presentation, 
including lighting and placement, of the work is not a destruction, 
distortion, mutilation, or other modification” that would otherwise 
violate VARA. 
  This Note argues that the public-presentation exception is 
injudicious in light of the rise of the contemporary art movement. Much 
more than artists of earlier movements, contemporary artists rely on 
precise arrangement of elements and engagement with the physical 
space surrounding these elements in the creation of a work of art. Yet 
it is control over those critical contextual elements, arguably the most 
critical element of a contemporary work, that VARA explicitly denies 
to the contemporary artist. The public-presentation exception threatens 
more than just the personal interests of artists—a greater societal 
interest in preserving authentic cultural heritage for future generations 
is continually undermined as long as the public-presentation exception 
remains codified in VARA. Lasting protection of the integrity of works 
of contemporary art thus requires the elimination of the public-
presentation exception. 
Copyright © 2017 Elizabeth Plaster. 
        †  Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2017; Washington University in St. Louis, 
B.A. 2013. Many thanks to Professor Deborah DeMott, for her invaluable guidance and insights 
throughout the writing process, and to the staff of the Duke Law Journal for devoting countless 
hours to this piece. Thanks are also due, as always, to my family. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since its unveiling in 1979, Flight Stop, the work of Canadian artist 
Michael Snow, has been viewed by millions of visitors to the Toronto 
Eaton Centre, a “downtown shopping mall and office complex.”1 
Commissioned to create a work to occupy a large sky-lit galleria open 
to several stories of galleries, Snow envisioned an artistic solution that 
would bring the natural world indoors: a flock of sixty fiberglass geese 
suspended from the glass ceiling, posed in the moment they have 
broken formation to alight at the mall’s southern entrance.2 Snow’s 
geese are not conventional sculptural works but rather three-
dimensional photographs, crafted by enveloping fiberglass bodies in 
printed suits developed from photographs taken by the artist of a 
deceased Canadian goose.3 As one scholar has noted, this treatment 
has rendered the work “more naturalistic—goosier—than 
conventional sculptural representation could . . . and this quality 
accentuates Snow’s artistic comment on the nature of photographic 
illusion, on the tendency to suspend disbelief.”4  
This “goosiness” was briefly interrupted during the late autumn of 
1982.5 Perhaps overcome with holiday spirit, Eaton Centre’s holiday 
decorators tied ribbons around the necks of each of the geese in Flight 
Stop, without the knowledge or consent of the artist.6 However festive 
the display, Snow was not amused. The artist sued Eaton Centre to 
have the ribbons removed, “adamant in his belief that his naturalistic 
composition ha[d] been made to look ridiculous by the addition of 
ribbons and suggest[ing] it [was] not unlike dangling earrings from the 
Venus de Milo.”7 The Ontario High Court of Justice agreed; the 
ribbons did “distort or modify the [artist’s] work” and, further, Snow’s 
concern that the ribbons were “prejudicial to his honour or reputation” 
was indeed reasonable under the circumstances.8 By order of the court, 
the Eaton Centre was to remove the ribbons without delay.9 Snow 
prevailed—but had his work been installed in a mall just fifty-four 
 
 1. Martha Langford, Michael Snow: Life & Work: Flight Stop, ART CAN. INST., 
http://www.aci-iac.ca/michael-snow/key-works/flight-stop [https://perma.cc/DD4P-XVX6]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id.  
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. 
 6. Snow v. Eaton Ctr. Ltd. (1982), 70 C.P.R. 2d 105, para. 3 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.). 
 7. Id. para. 6. 
 8. Id. para. 8 (interpreting § 12(7) of the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c C-30 (Can.)). 
 9. Id. para. 9.  
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miles southeast of Toronto in Buffalo, New York, the artist would 
likely have found himself out of luck.10  
American artists would have to wait a few more years before being 
granted rights similar to those recognized by the Canadian court in 
Snow. The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA)11 conferred on 
American artists certain moral rights long enjoyed by their European12 
and, more recently, Canadian counterparts.13 Unlike traditional 
property rights that vest in the owner of property, moral rights are 
personal and noneconomic rights that vest in the creator of a work and 
survive transfer of the ownership of the work.14 VARA protects two 
primary rights of the artist: the right of attribution15 and the right of 
integrity,16 the latter of which is the focus of this Note. 
VARA’s right of integrity first grants an artist the broad power to 
“prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification 
of th[e] work which would be prejudicial to [the artist’s] honor or 
reputation.”17 For works of “recognized stature,” artists are granted an 
additional right to enjoin “any intentional or grossly negligent 
 
 10. In 1982, the United States had not yet passed the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) and 
New York had not yet passed its Artist’s Authorship Rights Act (AARA), a 1984 law later 
preempted by the passage of VARA in 1990. Bd. of Managers of Soho Int’l Arts Condo. v. City 
of New York, No. 01 Civ.1226 DAB, 2003 WL 21403333, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2003) (holding 
that VARA preempts AARA). However, even after the passage of VARA, Snow would likely 
have been unable to enjoin the display the beribboned geese because of the public-presentation 
exception to VARA. This exception states that the “modification of a work of visual art which is 
the result of . . . the public presentation, including lighting and placement, of the work is not a 
destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification . . . unless the modification is caused by 
gross negligence.” Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, § 603, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2) (2012). For 
further discussion of the ambiguity in the public-presentation exception as applied to the facts of 
the Snow case, see infra Part I.D.2. 
 11. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 12. See generally Adolf Dietz, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Civil Law 
Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 199 (1995) (providing an overview of moral-rights laws 
in civil law countries, including Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland). 
 13. See generally Snow, 70 C.P.R. 2d 105 (setting the precedent that was settled six years 
before formal recognition of moral rights in a 1988 amendment to the Copyright Act of Canada).  
 14. See Robert J. Sherman, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: American Artists Burned 
Again, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 388 (1995) (“[M]oral rights are rights of personality, not 
property-based rights in the physical art work. Accordingly, a natural person, as the creator of a 
work and the copyright holder, can possess both personality and property rights in a work . . . .”).  
 15. For a definition, see infra note 29 and accompanying text.  
 16. For a definition, see infra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 17. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (2012). 
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destruction” of the work.18 These broad powers are significantly 
circumscribed by VARA’s public-presentation exception, 
§ 106A(c)(2), which states that a modification “which is the result . . . 
of the public presentation, including lighting and placement, of the 
work is not a destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification” 
that would otherwise violate VARA.19  
What types of practical implications does such an exception pose? 
The major implication is best illustrated by example: had Snow’s geese 
been beribboned in the United States, he would likely have had no 
legal recourse to have the ribbons removed—the ribbons being a 
matter of display of the work rather than a physical change to the work 
itself.20 In fact, the Judiciary Committee recommending VARA cited 
the facts of this very case as an illustration of a cause of action that 
would be precluded by the proposed public-presentation exception.21 
This Note argues that the public-presentation exception should be 
eliminated from VARA. Added to appease museums and galleries that 
feared loss of control over curatorial decisions, the public-presentation 
exception would have been justified under a traditional understanding 
of works of fine art as “separately conceived art object[s] . . . simply 
placed in a space.”22 However, in the context of contemporary art 
movements, such an understanding is no longer accurate or desirable. 
Much more than artists of earlier movements, contemporary artists 
rely on precise arrangement of elements and engagement with the 
physical space surrounding these elements in the creation of works of 
art.23 And yet it is control over those critical contextual elements, 
arguably the most critical elements of contemporary works, that 
VARA explicitly denies to contemporary artists. True protection of 
the integrity of works of contemporary art thus requires the 
elimination of the public-presentation exception. 
 
 18. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(B). 
 19. Id. § 106A(c)(2). 
 20. For further analysis of the facts of the Snow case under VARA, see infra Part I.D.2. 
 21. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 17 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6927. 
 22. Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 134 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 23. See MARTHA BUSKIRK, THE CONTINGENT OBJECT OF CONTEMPORARY ART 15 (2003) 
(“If the physicality of many minimalist works is only completed by the activation of the 
surrounding space, then this is a contingent physicality that ceases to exist when the elements of 
the work are disassembled . . . and can be profoundly compromised by a careless or imprecise 
arrangement of elements.”). For a discussion of the increasing importance of museum space and 
ready-made objects in contemporary art, see generally id. 
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This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of 
the development of moral-rights protection in the United States, 
covering its influences, goals, and problematic limitations. Part II 
considers two of the most widely influential contemporary art 
movements—minimalism and conceptual art. It examines the defining 
attributes of each movement and what makes each uniquely vulnerable 
under the public-presentation exception. Part III proposes the 
elimination of the public-presentation exception in § 106A(c)(3). This 
Part additionally explores how this amendment is consistent with the 
greater aims of VARA and considers the various limitations on the 
proposal that maintain an appropriate balance between the interests of 
artists and those who own and display their works. Finally, Part IV 
evaluates the other legal avenues available to artists to achieve 
comparable protection, ultimately concluding that none provide 
sufficient protection over rights of presentation.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. A Moral-Rights Primer 
The term “moral rights,” having nothing to do with ethical notions 
of morality, initially confuses many. Derived from the French droit 
moral, the adjective “moral” denotes a broader societal interest.24 
Moral rights are generally conceived of as “‘author’s rights’: the 
incorporeal, personal connection with one’s art work that most 
European legal systems have historically viewed as being separate from 
the pecuniary rights . . . protected under the United States copyright 
system.”25 Expanding on this definition, some have equated 
modifications of artworks to personal attacks on the artist herself.26  
The concept of moral rights originated in French law27 and 
encompasses under its umbrella four primary rights: attribution, 
disclosure, withdrawal, and integrity.28 The right of attribution, also 
called the right of paternity, protects “the right to be known as the 
author of one’s work [and] . . . to prevent others from being named the 
 
 24. Susan P. Liemer, Understanding Artists’ Moral Rights: A Primer, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 
41, 42 (1998).  
 25. Sherman, supra note 14, at 379. 
 26. Liemer, supra note 24, at 43. 
 27. See generally Susan P. Liemer, On the Origins of Le Droit Moral: How Non-Economic 
Rights Came to Be Protected in French IP Law, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 65 (2011) (providing an 
overview of the development of moral rights in French intellectual property law). 
 28. Sherman, supra note 14, at 381.  
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author of one’s work . . . .”29 The right to publish one’s work 
anonymously has intermittently been included under the right of 
attribution.30 The right of disclosure allows an author to decide when 
to make a work public, if at all,31 while the right of withdrawal permits 
an author to remove a work from public circulation “in order to modify 
or destroy it.”32 Rights of integrity empower authors to “object to any 
distortion, mutilation, or modification of his work that would be 
derogatory to his reputation or honor.”33 Of the four related rights, this 
right has been recognized as endowing artists with the most power and, 
unsurprisingly, has engendered the most antagonism.34 
Most legal systems protect these rights for at least as long as the 
life of the author.35 Those who support a duration limited to the life of 
the author argue that rights derived from a deeply personal—even 
spiritual—connection between author and work should only be 
enforceable by the author himself.36 If “an author’s external work 
embodies his personal message and thus is reflective of his individual, 
intrinsic creative process,” it is not appropriate for anyone else to be 
able to make decisions closely tied to the work, such as whether to 
disavow or allow a modification.37  
Yet those who identify preservation of cultural heritage as a 
justification for moral rights on par with authorial personality have 
argued for perpetual moral rights, as are afforded to artists in France.38 
A grant of perpetual rights follows logically from a moral-rights theory, 
explains Edward Damich, “because the work is not any less an 
expression of the author’s personality as time passes.”39 The public’s 
 
 29. Id. at 381 n.48. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 381 n.49. 
 32. Id. at 382 n.50. 
 33. Id. at 381 n.47. 
 34. Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors 
and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 565 (1940). 
 35. JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS 
IN CULTURAL TREASURES 22 (1999). 
 36. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the 
Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 2003 (2006); see also SAX, supra note 35, at 22 (“[A] 
work of art is conceived not only as an object, but as a constituent part of the artist’s personality.”). 
 37. Kwall, supra note 36, at 2003. 
 38. Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System of 
Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945, 993 (1990) (“[I]nsofar as moral 
rights protection indirectly benefits art preservation, perpetual protection is appropriate.”). 
 39. Id. 
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interest in enjoying “the fruits of a creator’s labors in original form and 
to learn cultural history from such creations” is not limited to the 
lifespan of the artist.40 A scheme of perpetual rights would allow the 
artist’s estate, or, at its broadest realization, the community as a whole, 
to sue to enforce moral rights to protect elements of cultural heritage 
for future generations.41 The debate as to which duration best serves 
the goals of moral rights, however, is outside the scope of this Note.  
B. The Berne Convention: American Reluctance and Adoption 
The oldest international copyright treaty, the Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, adopted its first 
moral-rights provision in 1928,42 forty-two years after opening for 
signature.43 This provision, article 6bis, codifies the moral rights of 
attribution and integrity:  
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the 
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim 
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or 
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the 
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.44 
The clause “or other derogatory action in relation to said work” was 
added in 1948 to “broaden the range of protection given to authors.”45 
Noticeably absent from protection are the moral rights of withdrawal 
and disclosure, which were omitted to attract more wide-ranging 
support from participating countries.46 Another compromise 
established the duration of the rights as the length of the economic 
rights of the author, usually death plus a number of years subsequent.47 
The United States first ratified the Berne Convention in 1935 but 
withdrew shortly thereafter when the Senate realized compliance with 
 
 40. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage 
Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 69 (1985). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 356 (2006). 
 43. Sherman, supra note 14, at 373 n.11. 
 44. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6bis, § 1, July 
14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 45. Sherman, supra note 14, at 385.  
 46. See id. at 384 (noting that “[t]he original article 6bis was the product of a compromise 
made for the benefit of common law countries” and that the rights of disclosure and withdrawal 
were not included). 
 47. Id. at 385. 
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the convention would require amendments to U.S. law.48 At the time, 
the most significant opponents to moral-rights legislation included 
movie studios and newspaper and magazine publishers who feared the 
adoption of such rights would severely curtail their editorial control.49 
Industry lobbying was hardly the sole barrier to moral-rights 
legislation, however; many have suggested the relatively late adoption 
of moral rights in the United States was primarily a function of 
American reluctance to “attach non-economic rights to property that 
do not belong to the traditional property owner.”50  
The movement in favor of moral rights did not start gaining 
traction until the mid-twentieth century, noncoincidentally coinciding 
with a boom in the American art scene.51 On the international scene, 
“American artists only gained . . . clout beginning with abstract 
expressionists . . . in the 1940s” and, as such, “the rise of the economic 
value of American art may have contributed to concern that 
destruction of such work would have a negative impact both culturally 
and economically.”52 Artistic interests aside, the true impetus for 
American accession to the Berne Convention was predominantly self-
serving: joining the Convention provided an opportunity to increase 
protection of American copyright interests abroad.53 Recognizing how 
“American popular culture and information products ha[d] become 
precious export commodities of immense economic value,” but that 
such “value [had been] badly eroded by low international copyright 
standards,” Congress intended to bolster the international legal regime 
by lending American “prestige and power” to the credibility of the 
 
 48. Id. at 398. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Natalia Thurston, Buyer Beware: The Unexpected Consequences of the Visual Artists 
Rights Act, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 701, 704 (2005). Speaking on the difficulty of passing moral-
rights legislation, California State Senator Alan Sieroty lamented,  
To pass this law, you have to get legislators to rethink their concepts of property rights. 
Property rights are very strong in this country, and that’s why we have not adopted art 
preservation laws. You have to begin to think that maybe the person who created the 
work . . . retain[s] some interest in seeing that the art is not destroyed, not mutilated, 
and not changed without the artist’s consent. 
Elizabeth Dillinger, Note, Mutilating Picasso: The Case for Amending the Visual Artists Rights 
Act to Provide Protection of Moral Rights After Death, 75 UMKC L. REV. 897, 904–05 (2007) 
(citations omitted). A decade before moral rights were recognized at the federal level in VARA, 
California enacted a statute conferring moral rights—the California Art Preservation Act of 1979 
(codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 2007)). 
 51. Thurston, supra note 50, at 705. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Sherman, supra note 14, at 398–99. 
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Convention’s standards, to the benefit of American authors.54 Further, 
according to Congress, no new laws were needed to bring the United 
States into compliance with the Convention, as existing state moral-
rights systems in concert with federal copyright and trademark law 
already provided satisfactory protection of artists.55 This minimalist 
approach was met almost immediately with both domestic and 
international criticism.56 Such criticism—centering on the hypocritical 
nature of American actions57—prompted the reintroduction to 
Congress of a federal moral-rights statute, an earlier version of which 
had been presented by Senator Edward Kennedy in 1989.58 Concluding 
a century-long conflict, Congress finally established a federal moral-
rights regime by passing VARA, which took effect June 1, 1991.59 
C. The Visual Artists Rights Act 
Rather than one extolling the “intimate bond” between an artist 
and her work, the view taken by Congress in enacting VARA was 
predominantly pragmatic: “The theory of moral rights is that they 
result in a climate of artistic worth and honor that encourages the 
author in the arduous act of creation.”60 This approach is consistent 
with the primary goal of the Copyright Act to incentivize creation, 
deriving its legitimacy in turn from the mandate of the Copyright 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution to “promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts.”61 
Supplementing the economic rights of artists already protected 
under the Copyright Act, VARA provides rights of attribution and 
integrity. The elements of the right of attribution are found in 
§ 106A(a)(1)(A) and (B): 
 
 54. H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 19–20 (1988).  
 55. Sherman, supra note 14, at 375. 
 56. Id. at 406–07. 
 57. The United States refused to join the Berne Convention out of reluctance to adopt a 
broad, federal moral-rights system. Upon accession to the Convention, Congress concluded that 
no new federal laws were necessary to bring the United States into compliance with the 
Convention. Id. at 397–99. 
 58. Id. at 407. Senator Kennedy’s bill protected a much broader class of artworks than would 
be protected by the version eventually codified in VARA and, significantly, did not allow for the 
waiver of moral rights. Id. 
 59. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 60. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 5 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6915. 
 61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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The author of a work of visual art— 
(1) shall have the right— 
(A) to claim authorship of that work, and 
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of 
any work of visual art which he or she did not create.62 
Section 106A(a)(2) further permits an artist to “disavow” a work of 
visual art that has been mutilated or modified, reflecting an 
understanding that a work that has been modified is no longer the same 
work that the artist authored.63 The right of integrity codified in 
§ 106A(a)(3) empowers artists: 
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other 
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his 
or her honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion, 
mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that 
right, and 
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, 
and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that 
work is a violation of that right.64 
Although reflecting the broad language of article 6bis of the Berne 
Convention, significant limitations narrow the reach of VARA. First, 
VARA applies only to “works of visual art,” an extremely limited 
category encompassing paintings, drawings, prints, and sculptures in a 
single copy or of a limited-edition run of two hundred or fewer signed 
and dated copies.65 Specifically excluded from this category are works 
made for hire, advertising and promotional materials, and numerous 
 
 62. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
 63. Id. § 106A(a)(2) (stating that an artist “shall have the right to prevent the use of his or 
her name as the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other 
modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation”). 
 64. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(A)–(B). 
 65. Id. § 101. A “work of visual art” is defined as: 
(1)  a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition     
of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author, 
or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 
200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature 
or other identifying mark of the author; or  
(2)  a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a  
single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or 
fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author. 
Id. 
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other types of visual works.66 Second, an artist’s rights under VARA 
are limited to the duration of the artist’s life and only apply to works 
created after the statute’s enactment.67 Third, the public-presentation 
exception prevents an artist from enjoining certain modifications of her 
work. 
D. The Public-Presentation Exception 
The right of integrity provided in § 106A(a)(3) is subject to further 
narrowing by the public-presentation exception in § 106A(c)(2), which 
provides: 
The modification of a work of visual art which is the result of 
conservation, or of the public presentation, including lighting and 
placement, of the work is not a destruction, distortion, mutilation, or 
other modification described in subsection (a)(3) unless the 
modification is caused by gross negligence.68 
This exception is quite troublesome if one accepts one of the most 
common justifications for providing artists with a right of integrity—
that “to deform artists’ work is to present them to the public as creators 
of something that is not their own and in that way to subject them to 
criticism for work they have not done.”69 It is particularly problematic 
given of the rise of contemporary art for which contextual elements are 
integral if not definitional. The unique vulnerability of contemporary 
art in the face of the public-presentation exception is examined below 
in Part II.  
 
 66. Id. § 101. The Act provides that a work of visual art does not include:  
(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, 
motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, 
periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic publication, or 
similar publication;  
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, 
covering, or packaging material or container;  
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii);  
(B)   any work made for hire; or  
(C)   any work not subject to copyright protection under this title. 
Id. 
 67. Id. § 106A(d)(1) (“With respect to works of visual art created on or after the effective 
date set forth in section 610(a) of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, the rights conferred by 
subsection (a) shall endure for a term consisting of the life of the author.”). 
 68. Id. § 106A(c)(2). 
 69. SAX, supra note 35, at 21. 
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1. Defining the Exception.  There are two potential situations 
where a display-type modification could result in an artist receiving an 
undeserved critique. First, the introduction of an offensive auxiliary 
element or the placement of a work in an offensive context may expose 
an artist to criticism resulting from an artistic choice they did not make. 
Consider the example of Maya Lin, designer of the Vietnam War 
Memorial in Washington, D.C. Lin intended that the memorial 
encompass “not only the black wall, but the grassy approach to it as 
well” and thus strenuously objected to the introduction of a nearby 
statuary group, which “interfere[d] with this intention by drawing 
approaching observers away from the wall and thereby altering the 
memorial itself.”70 Even if Lin were able to demonstrate that the 
introduction of the statuary group distorted her work in a manner 
prejudicial to her reputation, she would have no cause of action under 
VARA.71 An artist who discovers that her work has been hung in a 
bathroom stall at a museum or gallery is similarly powerless to object, 
despite the attendant prejudicial repercussions of such a display.72 
Second, a public-presentation modification results when the work 
is not displayed as the artist designed it. Artists whose works comprise 
multiple elements are particularly at risk of this type of modification. 
The Whitney Museum’s failed loan of Carl Andre’s Twelfth Copper 
Corner for a 1976 exhibition provides an apt illustration. The piece, a 
 
 70. Eric M. Brooks, “Tilted” Justice: Site-Specific Art and Moral Rights After U.S. Adherence 
to the Berne Convention, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1431, 1437 n.50 (1989). 
 71. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, ALBERT E. ELSEN & STEPHEN K. URICE, LAW, ETHICS 
AND THE VISUAL ARTS 773 (5th ed. 2007) (describing the juxtaposition of Lin’s memorial against 
the statuary group of American soldiers). 
 72. The restrooms of art museums are understood to be an inappropriate place to display 
works of art and, as such, have been the site of a number of satirical exhibitions. See Geoff Edgers, 
Breaking: Bathroom Art Takes over the MFA, BOSTON.COM (June 15, 2011, 5:15 PM), http://
archive.boston.com/ae/theater_arts/exhibitionist/2011/06/breaking_bathro.html [https://perma.
cc/3YMP-BCSF] (describing a group of artists who hung art in the bathroom of the Museum of 
Fine Arts in Boston to commemorate the Flush with the Walls exhibit and draw attention to local 
artists); Randy Kennedy, At the Modern, Art in a New York Minute, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/11/arts/design/11moma.html [https://perma.cc/H2GA-L5BK] 
(describing a group of master’s-degree students who staged an unauthorized exhibit in the fifth-
floor restroom at the Museum of Modern Art). One of the most well known of these protest 
exhibitions, called Flush with the Walls, was staged in the restroom of the Museum of Fine Arts 
in Boston in 1971. Without the knowledge or permission of the museum, a group of Boston artists 
planned the exhibition “to point out that the men’s room seem[ed] to be the only place in the 
Museum of Fine Arts that an exhibit by contemporary local artists [could] be seen.” Sarah Hwang, 
Flush with the Walls at the Museum of Fine Arts, BERKSHIRE FINE ARTS (May 7,  
2011), http://www.berkshirefinearts.com/05-07-2011_flush-with-the-walls-at-the-museum-of-fine-
arts.htm [https://perma.cc/D4HF-U3YX].  
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sculptural work comprising “50 cm x 50 cm copper plates set into the 
corner of the room in descending rows” forming a right triangle with a 
“jagged-edge hypotenuse,” requires a very particular space and 
arrangement.73 Bearing this in mind, the Whitney permitted Andre to 
participate in selecting an appropriate space—a space where the work 
could “take[] control not only of the floor, but also of the column of 
space that extends above the array of plates.”74 When the work was 
moved from the location he had chosen to a corner where it had to 
compete with a window and an emergency-exit door, Andre withdrew 
his piece.75 Though “[p]resumably the collectors and institutions that 
own [Andre’s] work also understand that the effect of the work 
depends on its placement within the space of the room” and that “the 
arrangement of elements is an integral part of Andre’s work,” the 
Whitney, one of the premier collections of contemporary American 
art, nevertheless chose to ignore the artist’s instructions regarding the 
presentation of the work.76 Luckily for Andre, he still owned the piece 
and was able to withdraw it from the exhibition. But even if VARA 
had been in existence at the time, it would not have provided the artist 
a cause of action. 
2. Remaining Ambiguity.  Much of VARA, including the public-
presentation exception, remains largely uninterpreted by the courts.77 
For one, there exists no clear line between those modifications that are 
a result of the public presentation of the work and those that are not. 
The facts of the Snow case provide a useful illustration of this 
ambiguity—is physically but nonpermanently affixing an auxiliary 
element to a work of art a matter of presentation?78 Neither VARA 
nor the remainder of the Copyright Act define public presentation 
beyond the explanation that it includes “lighting and placement.”79 In 
describing this exception, the Judiciary Committee explained that it 
would reserve for museums and galleries the “normal discretion to 
light, frame, and place works of art” but that “conduct that goes 
 
 73. BUSKIRK, supra note 23, at 27. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Kevin A. Goldman, Limited Times: Rethinking the Bounds of Copyright Protection, 154 
U. PA. L. REV. 705, 716 n.63 (2006) (explaining that the rights provided in VARA are “rarely 
litigated” because of the statute’s narrow definition of “work of visual art”). 
 78. For an explanation of the facts of the Snow case, see supra Introduction. 
 79. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2) (2012). 
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beyond the presentation of a work to physical modification of it is 
actionable.”80 But what constitutes a physical modification?  
Imagine that Eaton Centre had used specialized lighting to project 
Christmas ribbons onto the surface of the sculptural geese rather than 
using physical bows. These facts would seemingly fit squarely in the 
realm of a public-presentation modification, as the issue is one of 
lighting. What about the addition of physical ribbons? Although courts 
have yet to weigh in on this matter, one plausible distinction could be 
drawn as to the relative permanence of the modifications. The addition 
of a physical element, easily reversible without the intervention of art 
conservators, would not be considered a physical modification and 
would instead fall under the umbrella of public-presentation 
modifications. Modifications of this type would include such acts as 
placing a hat on a figural bust or displaying a work in a completely 
mirrored room. Permanent or semipermanent modifications, 
reversible but requiring professional intervention to restore the work 
to its original state, on the other hand, would be actionable under 
§ 106A(a)(3)(A) of VARA. Examples of modifications of this sort 
include painting a sculpture another color81 or cutting a painting into 
hundreds of pieces.82  
Employing this framework, Eaton Centre’s beribboning of Flight 
Stop would be distinguishable as a matter of public presentation falling 
within the § 106A(c)(2) exception. Yet it is plausible that a court faced 
with a similar fact pattern could take a narrower view of the statutory 
language to find that the introduction of an auxiliary element qualifies 
as an actionable modification under § 106A(a)(3)(A).83  
Although the public-presentation exception operates as a 
limitation on § 106A(a)(3) rights to prevent intentional modification 
or destruction of a work, VARA permits an artist to disavow a work 
that has been prejudicially modified as to an element of its 
presentation. Under § 106A(c)(2), a modification that is the result of 
the public presentation of the work “is not a destruction, distortion, 
 
 80. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 17 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6927. 
 81. In 1959, before installing an Alexander Calder mobile in the atrium of the Pittsburgh 
Airport, county maintenance workers repainted the work orange and green, the colors of 
Allegheny County. Megan M. Carpenter, Drawing a Line in the Sand: Copyright Law and New 
Museums, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 463, 485 (2011). 
 82. In 1986, an Australian company planned to turn a profit by cutting a Picasso linocut into 
five hundred one-inch squares and selling each square for $135. Dillinger, supra note 50, at 923.  
 83. This is made possible by the absence of the “physical modification” language used by the 
Judiciary Committee in the actual text of VARA. 17 U.S.C. § 106A. 
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mutilation or other modification described in subsection (a)(3).” 
However, an artist’s right to disavow a work—“to prevent the use of 
his or her name as the author of a work . . . in the event of a . . . 
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her 
honor or reputation”—is provided for in § 106A(a)(2). So, although an 
artist may not enjoin a modification to an element of the presentation 
of her work, if she can demonstrate that the modification, once carried 
out, is nonetheless prejudicial, she is empowered to disavow the work.  
In prohibiting the use of an artist’s name in relation to a modified 
work going forward, the right of disavowal does provide an artist some 
reputational relief. Museums can no longer attribute the work to the 
artist and auction houses will likely be unable to sell the work at all, 
given that disavowal creates “doubt as to attribution” in violation of 
sales contracts.84 This relief is limited to the extent the work is still 
widely known or recognizable as one by the artist even absent official 
attribution. A work that is recognizable, whether by the general public 
or by the art community, will continue to be associated with the artist 
even after he or she disclaims authorship of it. Irrespective of the legal 
significance of the act, disavowal cannot erase the memory of the 
public at large.85 
3. An International Comparison.  The American approach of 
including a public-presentation exception is not the standard around 
the world, as cases from Canada, France, and Germany demonstrate. 
In Snow v. Eaton Center, Ltd.,86 the Ontario High Court of Justice 
determined that the hanging of Christmas ribbons around the necks of 
sculptural geese was a modification “prejudicial to [the artist’s] honour 
or reputation.”87 The court noted that this standard necessarily 
 
 84. See Marc Jancou Fine Art Ltd. v. Sotheby’s, Inc., No. 650316, 2012 WL 7964120, at *4 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 13, 2012) (explaining that Sotheby’s did not breach their sales contract with 
Jancou in withdrawing a disavowed work from the auction because an artist’s disavowal of her 
work creates “doubt as to attribution”). 
 85. Disavowal can be a powerful tool in signaling to the community that a work has been 
modified against the wishes of the artist. But the strength of disavowal depends naturally on the 
extent to which the disavowal is publicized. Even then, the work will remain associated with the 
artist—becoming known, perhaps, as “the work formerly attributed to Artist X.” See, e.g., Amy 
Adler, Cowboys Milking: Formerly Attributed to Cady Noland, BROOKLYN RAIL (Mar. 4,  
2016), http://www.brooklynrail.org/2016/03/criticspage/cowboys-milking-formerly-attributed-to-
cady-noland [https://perma.cc/PZW9-3ZSG] (referring to the work disavowed by the artist Cady 
Noland). 
 86. Snow v. Eaton Ctr. Ltd. (1982), 70 C.P.R. 2d 105 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.). For an explanation 
of the facts of the Snow case, see supra Introduction. 
 87. Snow, 70 C.P.R. 2d para. 8. 
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involved “a certain subjective element or judgment on the part of the 
author so long as it is reasonably arrived at.”88 In a subsequent case, 
the Federal Court of Canada confirmed that a subjective criterion was 
appropriate but held that consideration of an objective criterion—
“evaluation of the prejudice based on public or expert opinion”—was 
also required.89  
In both France and Germany, the prohibition on modifications of 
a work under the right of integrity extends to contextual modifications 
“that leave the substance of a work intact, but that change the 
appearance or perception of the work by putting it into a context that 
differs from the one originally intended or envisioned by the author.”90 
Where on the same facts an American court had found no moral-rights 
violation,91 a French court held in favor of a Soviet composer who 
objected to the use of his work in an American film with an 
anticommunism theme.92 In a similar vein, the German Federal Court 
of Justice held that the addition of customized frames that extended 
the patterns of the paintings they held without the knowledge or 
consent of the artist violated the artist’s right of integrity.93 These two 
foreign decisions demonstrate “that a court in a nation adhering to the 
Berne Convention should find that an objectionable context violates a 
work’s integrity, for it results in a misrepresentation of the artist’s 
personality just as a mutilation would.”94 
II.  THE RISE OF CONTEMPORARY ART 
The public-presentation exception is particularly problematic for 
current artists in light of two of the most prominent contemporary art 
movements: minimalism and conceptual art. Both movements gained 
 
 88. Id. para. 5. 
 89. Prise de Parole Inc. v. Guérin, Éditeur Ltée (1995), 66 C.P.R. 3d 257, para. 26 (Can. Ont. 
Trial Div.). 
 90. Rigamonti, supra note 42, at 365. 
 91. Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 575, 578–79 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1948) (holding that there is no moral-rights violation when an artist’s work is placed in an 
objectionable context), aff’d, 275 A.D. 692 (N.Y. App. Div. 1949).  
 92. Brooks, supra note 70, at 1437–38 (referring to the Jan. 13, 1953 decision of the Cour 
d’appel, Paris, 1954 D. Jur. 16, 80). 
 93. DANNY FRIEDMANN, TRADEMARKS AND SOCIAL MEDIA: TOWARDS ALGORITHMIC 
JUSTICE 278 n.35 (2015) (relating the German court’s central ruling in the Hundertwasser case 
“that putting a painting in a frame which extends the patterns of the painting can be perceived as 
a new ‘Gesamtkunstwerk’, made by the author, and therefore violates the right of integrity of the 
work”). 
 94. Brooks, supra note 70, at 1438 (footnote omitted).  
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prominence in the 1960s95 and continue to influence if not define many 
of the artists of today. 
A. Minimalism 
Pioneered by artists such as Donald Judd, Sol LeWitt, Robert 
Morris, Carl Andre, and Dan Flavin, minimalism emerged in New 
York in the early 1960s.96 This movement consciously renounced as 
“stale and academic” the “overt symbolism and emotional content” of 
the art of previous generations.97 Eschewing the drama of abstract 
expressionism in particular, minimalists instead favor anonymity and 
an industrial aesthetic that calls attention to the materiality of the 
works.98 Characterized by simplified geometric forms and industrial, 
fabricated materials, minimalist works often involve “the repetition of 
identical units, and the activation of the surrounding or contained 
space.”99  
The early minimalist artists acknowledged that perception of a 
work changes as a viewer moves through space.100 As such, the 
engagement of viewers in the physical space surrounding the work 
represents a critical element of both the experience of the work and 
the work itself.101 As art critic Suzi Gablik has explained, well-known 
minimalist artists “Judd and Morris were concerned that the work 
should present itself as ‘one thing,’ a simple gestalt that can be 
perceived as a whole, effective as an all-at-once experience.”102 It is 
often the case in minimalist works that “the environment . . . becomes, 
as it were, the pictorial field,” for example, in the way in which a neon 
 
 95. Conceptual Art, MOMA LEARNING, http://www.moma.org/learn/moma_learning/
themes/conceptual-art [https://perma.cc/RYY9-BVVJ]; Minimalism, MOMA LEARNING, http://
www.moma.org/learn/moma_learning/themes/minimalism [https://perma.cc/KDW5-42P6]. 
 96. Minimalism, ART STORY: MODERN ART INSIGHT, http://www.theartstory.org/
movement-minimalism.htm [https://perma.cc/V35W-T6SJ]. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. BUSKIRK, supra note 23, at 3; see Minimalism: Serial Forms and Repetition,  
MOMA LEARNING, https://moma.org/learn/moma_learning/themes/minimalism/serial-forms-
and-repetition [https://perma.cc/6Z69-YC6J] (“Minimalists adopted the techniques and materials 
of the factory, and showed us our new 1960s world of industrial, mass-produced beauty.”). 
 100. Minimalism: Constructing Space, MOMA LEARNING, https://moma.org/learn/moma_
learning/themes/minimalism/constructing-space [https://perma.cc/5776-RMY4]. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Suzi Gablik, Minimalism, in CONCEPTS OF MODERN ART 244, 252 (Nikos Stangos ed., 
2d ed. 1981). 
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sculpture might diffuse iridescence upon the surrounding walls.103 
Unlike the traditional art object—“that unique, permanent yet 
portable . . . luxury item”104—minimalist art relies on the space around 
the work not simply as a secondary element of presentation but as a 
primary element of the work itself. 
One particularly representative example of minimalism is Morris’s 
work, Untitled (1965/71); the piece consists of four mirrored three-foot 
cubes arranged in a square.105 As the viewer moves around the work, 
“their mirrored surfaces produce complex and shifting interactions 
between gallery and spectator.”106 Forcing viewers to be 
simultaneously aware of their own body and the work of art, Untitled 
(1965/71) manifests the “minimalist archetype that contrasts the ideal 
world of art with the imperfection of reality.”107 
B. Conceptual Art 
Like minimalism, the conceptual art movement rejects another 
traditional notion of art: that “concerns such as aesthetics, expression, 
skill and marketability” are the relevant standards by which art should 
be judged.108 Instead, conceptual artists emphasize the idea over the 
physical product, believing that “the articulation of an artistic idea 
suffices as a work of art.”109 Though unified by this core belief, 
conceptual art lacks a cohesive style, often incorporating such 
nontraditional elements as photographs, musical scores, architectural 
drawings, and performances into works.110 “A doctrinaire 
Conceptualist viewpoint,” explained conceptual artist Mel Bochner in 
a mid-1970s interview, “would say that the two relevant features of the 
‘ideal Conceptual work’ would be that . . . it could be described and 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Roberta Smith, Conceptual Art, in CONCEPTS OF MODERN ART, supra note 102, at 256, 
256. 
 105. Robert Morris: Untitled 1965, Reconstructed 1971, TATE, http://www.tate.org.uk/art/
artworks/morris-untitled-t01532 [https://perma.cc/W5ZV-Y24G]. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Robert Morris: Untitled (Mirrored Cubes), 1965–1971, INHOTIM, http://www.
inhotim.org.br/en/inhotim/arte-contemporanea/obras/untitled-mirrored-cubes [https://perma.cc/
663F-WVGH]. 
 108. Conceptual Art, ART STORY: MODERN ART INSIGHT, http://www.theartstory.org/
movement-conceptual-art.htm [https://perma.cc/A273-SKFS].  
 109. Id. 
 110. Conceptual Art, MOMA LEARNING, supra note 95. For a discussion of limits on copyright 
protection for minimalist and conceptual works, see infra Part II.D. 
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experienced in its description, and that it be infinitely repeatable.”111 
The repeatability of the work derives from the understanding that, as 
conceptual artist Sol LeWitt put it, “the idea becomes the machine that 
makes the art.”112 As “all planning and decisions are made 
beforehand,” the actual execution of the physical work is often merely 
perfunctory.113 
Joseph Kosuth’s One and Three Chairs is a commonly cited 
example of conceptual art. The work is composed of a manufactured 
wooden folding chair, a photograph of the chair, and a copy of a 
dictionary entry of the word “chair.”114 As Kosuth has explained, 
“[f]undamental to [the conceptual] idea of art is the understanding of 
the linguistic nature of all art propositions, be they past or present, and 
regardless of the elements used in their construction.”115 Positioning an 
object, the chair, next to its visual and verbal forms, Kosuth prompts 
viewers of the work to reflect on the language of art—how it is seen, 
reproduced, and described. 
C. Contemporary Art as Objects Recontextualized 
In conceptual art, where the conveyance of the artistic idea is the 
work itself, a work’s success relies exclusively on the configuration or 
arrangement of the elements identified by the artist to his exact 
specifications. This is similarly true for the broader category of 
contemporary works beyond conceptual art. Many works of 
contemporary art are made through the act of designation or 
fabrication of an object based on instructions provided by the artist.116 
Indeed, it is not uncommon for the hand of the artist to be far removed 
from a work if not entirely absent.117 However, the materials used by 
an artist in creating her work are not synonymous with the work itself 
but are mere elements of the work. It is only when the physical 
 
 111. Smith, supra note 104, at 259 (quoting Mel Bochner with John Coplans, Mel Bochner on 
Malevich: an Interview, ARTFORUM June, 1974, at 59, 62 (1974)). 
 112. Id. at 261 (quoting Sol LeWitt, Paragraphs on Conceptual Art, ARTFORUM Summer, 
1967, at 79, 80 (1967)). 
 113. Id. 
 114. One and Three Chairs, MOMA LEARNING, https://www.moma.org/learn/moma_
learning/joseph-kosuth-one-and-three-chairs-1965 [https://perma.cc/HMM3-KVCL]. 
 115. Joseph Kosuth: One and Three Chairs, MOMA, http://www.moma.org/collection/works/
81435 [https://perma.cc/8V98-5JVX]. 
 116. BUSKIRK, supra note 23, at 4–10. 
 117. Id. at 6 (“The emphasis on idea or concept makes explicit the possibility that the work of 
art will not be synonymous with an object . . . .”). 
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elements are arranged to reflect the artist’s idea that a conceptual or 
minimalist work comes to life.118 Arranging the physical elements 
differently or introducing new elements (lighting, a window, or another 
work, for example) runs the risk of undermining the artistic idea and, 
thus, the very work itself.119  
That is not to say, however, that the introduction of any display 
element unanticipated by the artist will constitute a compromising 
distortion. The conclusion will naturally depend on the nature of the 
work itself: the illumination of one artist’s work by a spotlight may have 
no bearing on the idea conveyed, but that same act could create a 
significant prejudicial distortion for another artist, perhaps one 
working in neon. 
An additional factor distinguishing contemporary art from the 
genres of previous generations is the presumed context of the work. 
For works of contemporary art, the presumed space is overwhelmingly 
that of a museum or gallery space, and artists now commonly conceive 
of their works with these spaces in mind.120 For these works, and 
especially those “that are completed not in the studio but . . . in an 
exhibition or performance space, the [very] existence of the work itself 
is linked to its public presentation.”121 With contextual considerations 
a more critical artistic element than ever before, minimalist and 
conceptual artists are left particularly vulnerable by the exclusion of 
presentation modifications from the definition of actionable 
modifications under VARA.  
D. Contemporary Art’s Eligibility for Copyright Protection 
Satisfying the elements for federal copyright protection is a 
prerequisite for protection under VARA. Some works of conceptual 
and minimalist art, therefore, will be ineligible for VARA protection 
as they will fall under one of the specifically excluded categories of 
works listed in § 101, the definitions section of the Copyright Act.122 
Works may also be disqualified from VARA protection for failing to 
meet either the originality or fixation requirements necessary to merit 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 4–10. Because authorship is often entirely dependent on these directory acts by the 
artist, authorship may be compromised if such acts are interfered with, either by the failure to 
follow an instruction or by the addition of an unanticipated element. 
 120. Id. at 10. Buskirk considers this “recontextualization” to be a “technique that artists often 
choose to employ as a key element of the artistic process.” Id. 
 121. Id. at 14. 
 122. For the relevant text, see supra note 66. 
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copyright protection more generally. As part of the Copyright Act, 
VARA’s definition of “a work of visual art” expressly excludes “any 
work not subject to copyright protection under this title.”123 To merit 
copyright protection, a work must be an “original work[] of authorship 
fixed in a[] tangible medium of expression . . . from which [it] can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.”124 These 
requirements of originality and fixation, although easily satisfied by 
most traditional art objects, pose unique problems for some 
contemporary works. 
The threshold for originality is minimal.125 The standard requires 
“only that the work was independently created by the author (as 
opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least 
some minimal degree of creativity.”126 Further, originality does not 
require complete novelty, as a “work may be original even though it 
closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not 
the result of copying.”127  
An oft-cited example of a minimalist artist’s failure to overcome 
the original-expression requirement is Kazimir Malevich’s work White 
on White.128 As its title suggests, White on White is a painting of a “white 
square on a white background.”129 “[I]n light of Robert Rauschenberg’s 
series of all white paintings,” Malevich’s work would not be original 
because, although the ideas of the artists are unique, copyright requires 
unique expression.130 Minimalist artists who present “art items that are 
indistinguishable from the raw material” from which they are made 
may also run into trouble with the originality requirement.131 Those 
artists may find encouragement, however, in a 1992 decision by the 
D.C. Circuit: “Recalling the creativity of the work of Mondrian and 
Malevich, for example, we note that arrangement itself may be 
indicative of authorship.”132 Although the physical elements composing 
 
 123. Id.  
 124. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 125. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Rikki Sapolich, Note, When Less Isn’t More: Illustrating the Appeal of a Moral Rights 
Model of Copyright Through a Study of Minimalist Art, 47 IDEA 453, 466–67 (2007). 
 129. Id. at 464; see Suprematist Composition: White on White, MOMA (Sept. 17,  
2016), http://www.moma.org/collection/works/80385 [https://perma.cc/M2W7-Z5QC] (detailing 
the composition of the aforementioned artwork). 
 130. Sapolich, supra note 128, at 466–67. 
 131. Id. at 460. 
 132. Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242, 243 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
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the work of minimalist art on their own may lack the requisite 
creativity for copyright protection, the arrangement of such elements 
by the artist or under her direction may suffice to clear this very low 
threshold. 
Fixation is likewise a constitutional requirement for copyright 
protection, as “unless a work is reduced to tangible form it cannot be 
regarded as a ‘writing’ within the meaning of the constitutional clause 
authorizing federal copyright legislation.”133 Taking in mind these 
requirements, Professors Melville Nimmer and David Nimmer 
conclude that “certain works of conceptual art stand outside of 
copyright protection.”134 For example, a work constituting the action of 
an artist throwing colored streamers from an airplane, thereby 
“call[ing] attention to the higher spirit of mankind” by “sculpting in 
space,”135 would be outside copyright protection for failure to satisfy 
the fixation requirement. Although admittedly some conceptual works, 
especially those involving a performative aspect, will fail to satisfy the 
fixation requirement and thus be ineligible for VARA protection, by 
no means will all conceptual works fall into this category. A majority 
of the works of contemporary art will satisfy both the originality136 and 
fixation requirements.137  
E. Contemporary Art as Objects Threatened 
It at first seems counterintuitive that a work prizing “idea” over 
physical elements can nevertheless exist at the mercy of its 
presentation. But given “the degree to which the surrounding 
environment . . . [has] a profound impact on how the work is 
understood,” a contemporary artist without control over the 
presentation element of her work may cease to have a work at all, or 
at least one that is authentic.138 A few scholars, notably Professor Amy 
Adler, have taken a contrary view that “[m]oral rights law enshrines 
 
 133. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03[B] (2016). 
 134. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 135. Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532, 1577 n.204. 
 136. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The vast majority 
of works make the [creativity] grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, ‘no matter 
how crude, humble or obvious’ . . . .” (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 
340, 345 (1991))). 
 137. Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 304 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[M]ost works presented 
for copyright are unambiguously authored and unambiguously fixed.”).  
 138. BUSKIRK, supra note 23, at 23. 
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notions of art directly at odds with contemporary artistic practice.”139 
Adler notes that, while VARA purports to protect individual and 
public interests in art, it “vest[s] sole power to enforce the moral right 
in the individual artist.”140 This precludes the possibility, Adler 
observes, that a work of art actually be improved by a modification 
done in contravention of an artist’s wishes.141  
Adler’s position misunderstands the purpose of VARA as 
protecting the “best” art for preservation, rather than the “most 
authentic” art. While it is possible that a gallery owner or collector with 
impeccable taste may be the most able judge of what art is “best,” only 
the artist, as author, can be the arbiter of the authenticity of her own 
work.142 Further, Adler’s position conceives of the work and its 
presentation as separate, or at least separable, entities.143 As discussed 
above, this understanding of an art object is anachronistic in view of 
the rise of contemporary art. 
Under the traditional understanding of a work of art as a 
“separately conceived art object [that] is simply placed in a space,” the 
public-presentation exception is defensible.144 Although poor lighting 
or placement may impede the full appreciation of these works, “one 
doesn’t tend to think that the object itself has changed, whereas works 
involving components arrayed on the floor or walls of a room depend 
on their arrangement for their impact on a viewer.”145 Some slight 
deviations from the presentation intended by the artist are to be 
expected, and rarely will such a deviation rise to the level of prejudice 
to an artist’s reputation or honor. But when the rare situation does 
arise, an artist should be empowered to prevent such distorted 
displays—both from occurring in the first place and from continuing to 
be displayed in that manner. When an artist lacks such a power, the 
authenticity of her work is jeopardized. 
 
 139. Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 272 (2009). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 289 (“Another rationale for destruction in the name of advancing art arose in the 
modern period: modifying the original artists’ efforts would renew works of art and rescue them 
from death in the museum/mausoleum.”). 
 142. See Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation, supra note 36, at 1986 (explaining that the 
“essence of moral rights protection is the idea of respect for the author’s original meaning”). 
 143. See Adler, supra note 139, at 278 (“[A]ll curatorial choices change the meaning of a 
work.”). 
 144. Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 134 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 145. BUSKIRK, supra note 23, at 25. 
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III.  PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO VARA TO INCREASE PROTECTION 
OF THE INTEGRITY OF CONTEMPORARY ART 
A. Proposal To Eliminate the Public-Presentation Exception 
Protection of the integrity of works by contemporary artists 
requires the elimination of the public-presentation exception to 
VARA. Instead of eliminating § 106A(c)(2) altogether, this Note 
suggests merely replacing the word “public” currently in the statute 
with “private.” This amendment would provide a cause of action to 
enjoin prejudicial modifications that are a result of the public 
presentation of a work while underscoring the fact that private displays 
of an artwork do not fall under the ambit of the statute. Public 
presentation would include displays in museums, galleries, parks, 
building lobbies, or any other such place where the work is regularly 
accessible to individuals beyond just the owner of the work and her 
family and friends. On the other hand, displaying a work in a home or 
personal office would be considered private and outside VARA’s 
reach. Such an exception is appropriate given that a private display is 
by definition one to which only a limited number of individuals have 
access and therefore unlikely to have much effect on an artist’s 
reputation.146  
For an artist to enjoin a modification resulting from an element of 
the public presentation of a work under VARA as it currently stands, 
an artist must provide evidence that the modification is prejudicial to 
her reputation or honor. This Note proposes this right should take the 
form of a tort-type right rather than a more expansive property-type 
right; a tort-type right would “permit[] an artist to sue for injunction or 
damages when his work is mistreated in ways that cause conspicuous 
injury to his reputation.”147 Bringing a successful claim will naturally 
involve convincing a court that the mistreatment caused the artist 
injury.148 This contrasts with a property-type right, which “permit[s] an 
artist to retain a property right in his work,” the content of which he 
could largely determine without convincing a court.149 
 
 146. For further discussion of the exclusion of private displays from the ambit of the statute, 
see infra notes 178 and 181 and accompanying text. 
 147. Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: A Comparative 
Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 118 (1997). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 118–19. 
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As to the standard used by a court in determining prejudice, a 
mixed objective–subjective standard is advisable.150 A case from the 
Federal Court of Canada, Prise de Parole Inc. v. Guérin, Éditeur 
Ltée,151 provides a useful exemplar of such a standard.152 In determining 
whether modifications made to an author’s story in a reproduction 
violated the author’s right of integrity, the court first considered the 
subjective view of the author, finding that the author was frustrated by 
a clumsy reproduction and wished not to have his name associated with 
it.153 Considering this view credible, the court nevertheless found that 
the author failed to prove the second prong of the prejudicial 
standard—that there was objective evidence of damage to the author’s 
reputation, essentially that the author’s subjective belief was 
reasonable.154 Because there had been no change in the number of 
public appearances by the author, no ridicule or mocking by associates 
or the newspapers, and no complaints about the editing of the excerpts, 
the court found no objective evidence of prejudice.155  
In the context of fine art under VARA, the court could also 
consider testimony of experts such as art professors and gallery owners 
in evaluating evidence of objective prejudice.156 As this requires judges 
or juries to assess the credibility of competing experts, this option is not 
ideal157 but has nevertheless proved workable in a number of cases 
involving VARA claims.158  
 
 150. An objective criterion evaluates prejudice based on public or expert opinion while a 
subjective standard considers the opinion of the artist that a modification is prejudicial, so long as 
her judgment is reasonable. For further discussion, see supra notes 88 and 89 and accompanying 
text. 
 151. Prise de Parole Inc. v. Guérin, Éditeur Ltée (1995), 66 C.P.R. 3d 257 (Can. Ont. Trial 
Div.). 
 152. The case involved a publisher who had been assigned rights by an author objecting to the 
use of large segments of that author’s work in the publication of a collection of stories for schools. 
Id. paras. 24–26. 
 153. Id. paras. 24–25. 
 154. Id. para. 28. 
 155. Id. paras. 27–28. 
 156. See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (considering 
the testimony of expert witnesses, including art professors and the president of an art gallery), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 157. See Richard J. Hawkins, Substantially Modifying the Visual Artists Rights Act: A 
Copyright Proposal for Interpreting the Act’s Prejudicial Modification Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 
1437, 1474 (2008) (discussing the problems attendant with the introduction of expert witnesses 
into litigation). 
 158. Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 593 F.3d 38, 62 (1st Cir. 
2010) (“Büchel proffered an expert who opined that showing an unfinished work without the 
artist’s permission is inherently a distortion.”); Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 
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The use of an objective standard is advisable for a number of other 
reasons. First, using an objective standard to evaluate the prejudicial 
nature of a modification to an artist’s work will thwart frivolous suits 
based on “mere relocation” or nonprejudicial lighting choices made by 
galleries or museums. Additionally, museums or galleries that are 
concerned with the ability to control the presentation of a work without 
interference by an artist have the option, at the time of purchase or 
loan from the artist, to contract with the artist as to which methods of 
presentation will or will not be deemed a modification or distortion 
prejudicial to the artist’s reputation. Evidence of such an agreement 
would provide strong evidence in court that a certain modification 
either is or is not prejudicial in violation of VARA. If elements of 
presentation are unimportant to an artist, she can likewise waive these 
VARA rights in a written contract, as allowed for in § 106A(e)(1), an 
option buyers especially concerned with insulating themselves from 
litigation may be motivated to pursue.159 This allocation of rights forces 
discussion: buyers are incentivized to engage in dialogue with artists 
during the purchase process to find out how the artists intend the work 
to be displayed to minimize the risk of a later suit. 
B. The Proposed Amendment Is Consistent with the Aims of VARA 
1. Nonpecuniary Interests of the Artist.  According to the Judiciary 
Committee’s report, the moral rights granted by VARA “promote . . . 
the interests of artists and public alike.”160 VARA rights most 
obviously benefit artists by serving a number of nonpecuniary interests. 
In ensuring artists’ recognition for works they have created and 
protecting the fruits of their artistic labor from destruction or 
mutilation, VARA “may enhance the creative environment in which 
artists labor.”161 These safeguards also protect an artist on an emotional 
 
128, 134 (1st Cir. 2006) (discussing the expert testimony of an art history professor and of a 
director of an art institute); Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 314 (considering the expert testimony of an art 
professor and of an art gallery president). 
 159. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (2012) (“The rights conferred by subsection (a) . . . may be 
waived if the author expressly agrees to such waiver in a written instrument signed by the author. 
Such instrument shall specifically identify the work, and uses of that work, to which the waiver 
applies, and the waiver shall apply only to the work and uses so identified.”). 
 160. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 14 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6924. 
 161. Nathan Murphy, Thème et VARAations: Why the Visual Artists Rights Act Should Not 
Protect Works-In-Progress, 17 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 110, 148 (2010) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-
514, at 13, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6924). As a point of clarification, “fruits,” as used 
above, refers to the works the artist produces as opposed to the profits to be reaped from the 
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level, insulating him from “personal anguish the artist feels from seeing 
his work abused.”162 The thinking is that artists will be more willing to 
dedicate their proverbial blood, sweat, and tears into artistic creation 
if they are assured of their right to preserve the integrity of their works 
for the remainder of their lifetimes. 
Extending the right of integrity to include aspects of presentation 
only bolsters the artist’s nonpecuniary interests. For some artists, 
especially conceptual artists, preserving the integrity of the mode of 
presentation can be more important than the preservation of the 
integrity of the physical materials used to assemble the work.163 If an 
artist cannot be sure that her work will be presented in a manner 
consistent with her vision, she may not bother creating such a work in 
the first place.164 Not every artist will take a hands-on approach to 
presentation, instead preferring for the owner of the work to display it 
as she sees fit. Yet the preference of some artists should not undercut 
the rights of others to whom presentation is an integral element of their 
work. 
2. Pecuniary Interests of the Artist.  Broader VARA protection will 
also enhance the pecuniary interests of artists. It is noted that “the 
economic incentive for the creation and dissemination of artistic work 
which is furnished by copyright protection is threatened to the extent 
that the artist is unable to control the manner in which his work is 
displayed to the public upon which he is financially dependent.”165 Any 
 
production of these works. See Kwall, supra note 40, at 69 (referring to “the fruits of a creator’s 
labors”). 
 162. Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 147, at 102. 
 163. BUSKIRK, supra note 23, at 6–11, 13. Consider the example of Gnaw, a sculptural work 
by Janine Antoni in the collection of the Museum of Modern Art in New York. The work 
comprises two six-hundred-pound cubes, one of lard and the other of chocolate, which have been 
gnawed on by the artist. A case of 130 lipsticks and twenty-seven heart-shaped packages of 
chocolate made from chewed-off pieces of these blocks accompany the cubes. The physical 
materials (the lard and chocolate) disintegrate over the course of the display and are expected, if 
not intended, by Antoni to do so. In this work, the physical integrity of the materials is not a 
crucial element of the work; rather it is the presentation of the cubes of lard and chocolate in 
juxtaposition with the cases of “gnawed by-products” that is key to Antoni’s artistic statement. 
Id.  
 164. See Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 593 F.3d 38, 49 (1st Cir. 
2010) (“The recognition of moral rights fosters a ‘climate of artistic worth and honor that 
encourages the author in the arduous act of creation.’” (quoting Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 
71 F.3d 77, 83 (2d. Cir. 1995))). 
 165. Case Comment, Protection of Artistic Integrity: Gilliam v. American Broadcasting 
Companies, 90 HARV. L. REV. 473, 477 (1976); see, e.g., Brooks, supra note 70, at 1443 n.99 (using 
this same quotation).  
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alteration of works that have already been sold also affects both the 
price of future works by the artist and the resale price of works in the 
market.166 Most importantly, the price of the work that has been altered 
will drop: an altered work is no longer truly the artist’s “own” and will 
command a lower price than a work in pristine condition. But a 
modification of just one work can have detrimental effect on the value 
of the artist’s entire oeuvre.167 One explanation for this phenomenon is 
the idea that each of an artist’s works exists as an advertisement for all 
of her other works.168 One less than stellar review of a work, paired 
with a low valuation, adversely affects an artist’s overall reputation. As 
an artist’s reputation has perhaps more influence on the demand for 
and the price of her works than any other factor, a blow to reputation 
translates into lower valuation for both extant and future works.169 
When an unauthorized modification results in a negative review, the 
entire body of an artist’s work is devalued undeservedly and unfairly. 
This phenomenon can be especially devastating to young or 
unestablished artists who are disproportionately dependent on just a 
few early pieces to establish their reputations and build market 
interest.170 As Professor Jane Ginsburg has pointed out, “[r]eputation 
is critical to a person who follows a vocation dependent on 
commissions from a variety of clients. Success breeds success, but only 
if the first success is known to potential clients.”171 There is no reason 
to think that, in the case of a work to which the presentation is an 
integral element, a modification to an artist’s intended display of a 
 
 166. Murphy, supra note 161, at 149; see Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 147, at 104 
(“[A]lteration of works that an artist has already sold can, by damaging his reputation, lower the 
prices he can charge for other work that he sells subsequently.”). 
 167. Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 147, at 104–05. Professors Henry Hansmann and 
Marina Santilli liken the relationship between a single work and the rest of the artist’s oeuvre to 
the relationship between franchisor and franchisee:  
An individual franchisee has an incentive to skimp on quality, cutting his individual 
costs while still enjoying the reputation for high quality that is associated with the 
franchise in general. But, in doing so, he is free riding on the other franchisees and 
imposing a cost on them. For this reason, franchisors commonly impose strong quality 
standards on their individual franchisees. For the same reason, an artist has an interest 
in preventing the reputation of his work in general from being depreciated by the 
opportunistic adulteration of individual works. 
Id. 
 168. Id. at 104. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Cambra E. Stern, A Matter of Life or Death: The Visual Artists Rights Act and the 
Problem of Postmortem Moral Rights, 51 UCLA L. REV. 849, 863 (2004).  
 171. Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trademarks 
Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263, 265 (2004). 
PLASTER IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/25/2017  9:11 PM 
2017] WHEN STUFF BECOMES ART 1141 
work poses any less of a threat to her reputation than a modification to 
the physical elements of the work itself. Any distortion, if visible at 
length to the public, has the potential to garner a negative review and 
engender disastrous reputational effects. 
3. Third-Party Interests.  Parties beyond the artist herself also 
benefit from increased VARA protection. For one, owners or 
subsequent purchasers of an artist’s work have interests aligned with 
the artist in preserving if not enhancing market value for these works, 
insofar as market value is enhanced by preserving the authenticity of 
the work. 
The public at large has a different but no less important interest in 
having an artist’s artistic choices respected: the preservation of cultural 
heritage for future generations. Both current and future generations 
have an interest in “seeing, or preserving the opportunity to see, the 
work as the artist intended it, undistorted.”172 Besides an interest in 
preserving integrity of a work to ensure the most accurate historical 
record, scholars have also noted an interest more deeply personal—
essentially that “[w]e yearn for the authentic, for contact with the work 
in its true version.”173 
Presentation is vital to the integrity of minimalist and conceptual 
works and thus is a major consideration in preservation efforts. For 
many of these works, possessing the otherwise intact physical elements 
means very little. Rather, it is the display of the constituent elements 
as an integrated whole in a manner consistent with the artistic vision 
that conveys the intended message.174 Simply having a stack of metal 
plates is not the same as having a work by Andre. Not until the plates 
have been arranged as instructed by the artist is the work animated. 
“Stuff,” arranged correctly, becomes art.  
When artists lack adequate control over the presentation of their 
works, a risk arises that works will not be authentically preserved for 
future generations.175 The continued display of the work in a distorted 
 
 172. John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1041 
(1976). 
 173. Id. 
 174. For a discussion of the importance of the configuration of artistic elements to works of 
contemporary art, see supra Part II.C. 
 175. See John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 
339, 356 (1989) (“Physical preservation of discrete objects themselves may not be enough. Every 
cultural object is to some extent a part of a larger context from which it draws, and to which it 
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state of presentation permits an “inauthentic piece” to become part of 
our cultural heritage, providing inaccurate information to future 
generations. Permitting an artist to enjoin these displays during her 
lifetime should provide ample time for suitable documentation of the 
authentic oeuvre. 
C. Limitations of the Proposed Amendment 
The public-presentation exception was added to VARA in large 
part to quiet opposition to the statute from museum and gallery owners 
concerned about VARA’s intrusion on their “normal discretion to 
light, frame, and place works of art.”176 The elimination of the public-
presentation exception will not threaten this “normal discretion,” 
however, because to constitute a modification or distortion in 
contravention of VARA the modification must be “prejudicial to [the 
artist’s] honor or reputation.”177 Requiring not only subjective but also 
objective evidence of prejudice will insulate museums against frivolous 
suits as the majority of changes in lighting or placement will not rise to 
the level of objectively prejudicial. Additionally, artists are generally 
disincentivized from being overly litigious. If an artist earns a 
reputation for being difficult to work with, she jeopardizes future 
opportunities for gallery and museum exhibitions and commissions—
in effect, her livelihood. 
Another significant limitation on this Note’s proposal is its 
inapplicability to private displays of a work. The first reason for this is 
purely practical: if the work is only displayed in a private collector’s 
home, the artist may have no way of finding out how the work is 
displayed. But more crucially, private display has much less bearing on 
an artist’s interests. If the “alteration has not been revealed to the 
public[, it] thus has no impact on the work’s value” or, relatedly, on the 
artist’s reputation.178 Consider the example of Graham Sutherland’s 
portrait of Winston Churchill. It is now well known that Churchill’s 
widow stored the much-loathed portrait in the cellar of her country 
 
adds, meaning. Separated from its context, ‘decontextualized,’ the object and the context both 
lose significance.”). 
 176. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 17 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6927; see also 
YEARBOOK OF CULTURAL PROPERTY LAW 2009, at 284 (Sherry Hutt & David Tarler, eds. 2009) 
(“[The public-presentation exception] was included in the statute so that galleries and museums 
could ‘continue to have normal discretion to light, frame, and place works of art.’” (quoting H.R. 
REP. NO. 101-514, at 17 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6927). 
 177. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). 
 178. Murphy, supra note 161, at 149. 
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home next to the boiler for many years.179 Under VARA, Mrs. 
Churchill would still be completely within her right—a private owner 
is under no obligation to display a piece at all.180 If Mrs. Churchill had 
instead preferred to hang the portrait in her dining room but covered 
by a sheet, she would have been equally entitled to do so. A private 
owner in this situation might only run into trouble if she started 
conducting regular public tours of the home during which the work 
would be viewable in a prejudicial context.181  
Providing the broadest protection to works by contemporary 
artists would require the protection of site-specific works under 
VARA.182 Nevertheless, both the legislative history of VARA and case 
law construing the statute reject the notion that VARA applies to site-
specific works.183 Although “[a]rtists often claim . . . that to remove a 
site-specific work elsewhere is effectively to destroy it, or at least to 
alter it in ways that profoundly distort the artist’s intention,” 
consideration of the rights of property owners weighs against giving 
site-specific works VARA coverage.184 U.S. courts have been wary of 
constraining what property owners can do with their land, and allowing 
artists to enjoin the removal of site-specific works not only impairs the 
potential alienability of the land but also “compel[s] unwilling people 
 
 179. SAX, supra note 35, at 25.  
 180. Thurston, supra note 50, at 719 (“[A]rtists have no right of display.”). 
 181. The line between public and private may be a matter of fact for the jury to resolve. Has 
an owner who has hosted a well-attended fundraising dinner for a high-profile political candidate 
displayed a work publicly? Depending on the attendees, one could imagine that an artist’s 
reputation could be harmed after only a small but well-connected group had access to the work. 
 182. For discussion of VARA’s application to site-specific works, see generally Brooks, supra 
note 70. Richard Serra’s Tilted Arc was an example of a site-specific sculpture designed for the 
Foley Federal Plaza in Manhattan. The sculpture, a twelve-foot tall, 120-foot long unfinished plate 
of COR-TEN steel, bisected the plaza, blocking the path and view of pedestrians. After much 
debate, and a lawsuit, Tilted Arc was dismantled and removed from the site in 1989, a year before 
VARA’s enactment. Jennifer Mundy, Lost Art: Richard Serra, TATE (Oct. 25, 2012), 
http://www.tate.org.uk/context-comment/articles/gallery-lost-art-richard-serra [https://perma.cc/
JGA9-QERT]. 
 183. Jane C. Ginsburg, A ‘Potato’ Firmly Planted: Moral Rights and Site-Specific Art, MEDIA 
INST. (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2013/022613.php [https://perma.cc/
7SWJ-X2XN]; see also Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 143 & n.12 (1st Cir. 
2006) (concluding that site-specific works are not protected under VARA and noting that in 
addition to its reading of the statute’s plain meaning, the legislative history “never mentioned” 
site-specific art); H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 17 (1990), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6927 
(“Generally, the removal of a work from a specific location comes within the [public-presentation] 
exclusion because the location is a matter of presentation . . . .”). 
 184. SAX, supra note 35, at 27. 
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to experience their work far into the indefinite future.”185 VARA’s 
inapplicability to works for hire186 and works incorporated into 
buildings187 similarly protects the freedom of a real estate owner to deal 
with her property as she sees fit. 
Finally, VARA’s waiver provision represents a notable potential 
check on the rights of an artist.188 Section 106A(e)(1) provides:  
The rights conferred by subsection (a) may not be transferred, but 
those rights may be waived if the author expressly agrees to such 
waiver in a written instrument signed by the author. Such instrument 
shall specifically identify the work, and uses of that work, to which the 
waiver applies, and the waiver shall apply only to the work and uses 
so identified.189 
In drafting VARA, the Judiciary Committee recognized that routine 
waivers of VARA rights would “eviscerate the law” but, on balance, 
believed that “to proscribe waiver would be to inhibit normal 
commercial practices.”190 If absolute control over a piece is critical to 
the buyer, she may negotiate with the artist for a waiver of certain 
moral rights. But, as some scholars contend, because the grant of moral 
rights increases an artist’s bargaining power by shifting the initial 
allocation of rights to the artist, artists are still better off post-VARA 
despite the waiver provision.191 An artist who values control above all 
else always has the option of retaining full VARA protection, though 
at the expense of potentially lucrative sales contracts. In that way, the 
creator of the work, rather than the purchaser, becomes the judge of 
the value of the continuing integrity of her creation while still 
permitting the purchaser an option to bargain for control by offering 
higher prices. 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Section 101 of the Copyright Act provides that a work of visual art does not include any 
work made for hire. For the language of 17 U.S.C. § 101, see supra note 66. 
 187. Id. 
 188. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (2012). 
 189. Id. 
 190. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 18 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6928. 
 191. See, e.g., Kwall, supra note 36, at 1996 (“[T]he very purpose of moral rights laws is to 
‘alter the bargaining power between the authors and artists and those who use their works.’” 
(quoting Adolf Dietz, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Civil Law Countries, 
19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 199, 212 (1995))). 
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IV.  FAILURE OF OTHER LEGAL REGIMES TO PROTECT INTERESTS 
OF CONTEMPORARY ARTISTS 
The elimination of the public-presentation exception is further 
necessitated by the failure of other laws—most critically contract and 
copyright—to provide alternate avenues to protect artistic interests. 
A. Contract Law Cannot Protect Artistic Interests in Public 
Presentation 
Historically, artists had relatively weak bargaining positions in 
negotiating contract terms at the time of sale.192 After the recognition 
of moral rights in VARA, artists enjoy “enhance[d] . . . bargaining 
power in drafting and negotiating contracts,” but only as to terms that 
are recognized as VARA rights.193 In light of the public-presentation 
exception, Professor Russ VerSteeg suggests that, “[i]f an artist wishes 
to have a work framed in a particular manner, . . . [or] wishes his or her 
works to be exhibited in a certain location in the gallery or lighted in a 
certain way, the only viable control he or she can assert . . . is by 
contract.”194 Yet given “‘the very informality of art work commissions’ 
and the ‘handshake deal[s]’ that are most common in art transactions,” 
it is unrealistic to assume that a majority of artists will have the 
opportunity to protect the integrity of their works through contractual 
means.195 
When such an opportunity does present itself, the contract will 
bind the initial purchaser of the work. As to subsequent purchasers, 
though, it is doubtful that these contractual provisions will be binding196 
because U.S. contract law requires parity between contracting parties 
to establish binding terms.197 Without knowing each and every 
 
 192. Russ VerSteeg, Federal Moral Rights for Visual Artists: Contract Theory and Analysis, 67 
WASH. L. REV. 827, 843 (1992). 
 193. Id. at 844. 
 194. Id. at 865.  
 195. Id. at 845 (quoting Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright in the 101st Congress: Commentary on 
the Visual Artists Rights Act and the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 
1990, 14 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 477, 488 (1990)). 
 196. Id. at 865. 
 197. Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1, 53 
(1997). Consider this situation: Artist contracts with Purchaser that Purchaser will never frame 
the work. Purchaser later sells the work to Collector, who immediately frames it. Artist has no 
contractual cause of action against Collector because Collector was not party to the original 
contract between Artist and Purchaser. Artist could have contracted with Purchaser that if 
Purchaser sold the work, he would sell it with a clause obligating subsequent owners to never 
frame the work. This is still not an effective solution, however, because if Purchaser were to 
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subsequent transferee, an artist has no method for binding these parties 
to the terms of the initial sales contract. 
Another complication of the reliance on contractual agreements 
in binding subsequent purchasers is the unpredictable enforceability of 
equitable servitudes on chattels.198 Under U.S. contract law, sellers of 
chattels such as artwork “cannot reserve rights in the chattel, of either 
an affirmative or a negative character, that are enforceable against 
subsequent purchasers.”199 The doctrine of moral rights codified in 
VARA alters this rule but only with respect to the few rights 
enumerated in the statute. Excluding matters of public presentation 
from VARA’s scope effectively precludes artists from having a say in 
the presentation of their work beyond that by the original purchaser. 
B. Copyright Law Cannot Protect Artistic Interests in Public 
Presentation 
Aspects of the American copyright regime likewise provide little 
assistance to artists looking to retain control over presentation 
elements of their work. For instance, casting the modification to the 
presentation of a work as the creation of an unauthorized “derivative 
work” has initial appeal but ultimately proves unworkable. A 
“derivative work” is defined in § 101 of the Copyright Act as one that 
“‘represent[s] an original work of authorship’ but is ‘based upon one 
or more preexisting works’ and that ‘recast[s], transform[s], or adapt[s]’ 
the preexisting work.”200 The derivative work must be copyrightable in 
its own right, meaning that the author must contribute “a modicum of 
‘originality’” necessary to achieve that copyright.201 Because of this 
additional modicum-of-creativity requirement, “[n]ot all alterations or 
mutilations of an artist’s work that are prejudicial to his honor or 
reputation may constitute ‘derivative works,’ which infringe upon the 
copyright holder’s exclusive rights.”202 This was the case in Lee v. 
 
violate this contractual term and the subsequent owner framed the work, Artist would have a 
valid breach of contract claim against Purchaser but would still lack a cause of action as to the 
subsequent buyer. 
 198. Id. at 54 n.261 (describing that the author’s research has turned up only two cases since 
1956 in which a court expressly enforced an equitable servitude in chattels). 
 199. Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 147, at 101. 
 200. Brooks, supra note 70, at 1452 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)). 
 201. Id. (citing the standard developed in Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 
340, 345 (1991)). 
 202. Burton Ong, Why Moral Rights Matter: Recognizing the Intrinsic Value of Integrity 
Rights, 26 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 297, 310 (2002). 
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Albuquerque A.R.T. Co.,203 a Seventh Circuit decision that found that 
the mounting of copyrighted note cards onto ceramic tiles did not 
qualify as a derivative work but instead merely changed the mode of 
display.204 In this case, the artist would have had no recourse under 
VARA because the court determined that the issue was one of display, 
explicitly exempted from coverage by the public-presentation 
exception.205 
One pre-VARA case, Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos.,206 
suggested that a copyright theory could be employed to protect an 
artist’s display interests,207 but this avenue of recovery has likely been 
cut off by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Dastar Corp. v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.208 In Gilliam, the Second Circuit 
held that, absent an agreement stating otherwise, the right to make 
changes to a television show resided in the authors of the show.209 
Agreeing that broadcasting an unapproved, edited version of Monty 
Python’s Flying Circus injured the plaintiffs’ business and personal 
reputation by misrepresenting their work, the court approved a 
“vindicat[ion of] the author’s personal right to prevent the presentation 
of his work to the public in a distorted form.”210 However, after the 
Supreme Court in Dastar declined to give a liberal interpretation to a 
provision of the Lanham Act “in part because the protection the 
plaintiffs sought was already provided, much more specifically, in 
VARA,” the viability of an “intellectual property theory of moral 
rights recovery outside of VARA” is significantly diminished.211 Now 
that there is a section of the Copyright Act that vindicates moral rights, 
it is unlikely that a court will be persuaded to find additional moral-
rights protection, especially rights intentionally and specifically 
excluded under VARA, under an alternate section. A finding of 
additional protection is especially improbable because the remainder 
 
 203. Lee v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 204. Id. at 582. But see Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1344 
(9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the mounting of copyrighted note cards onto ceramic tiles did qualify 
as derivative works that infringed the copyright). 
 205. A VARA claim was not actually pursued in this case because the note cards at issue did 
not satisfy the § 101 definition of “works of visual art”: they were not part of a limited edition of 
two hundred or fewer, signed and consecutively numbered by the artist. Lee, 125 F.3d at 583. 
 206. Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 207. Id. at 21. 
 208. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
 209. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 22.  
 210. Brooks, supra note 70, at 1456 (quoting Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24). 
 211. Murphy, supra note 161, at 154 n.228. 
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of the Copyright Act outside of VARA has been understood as 
primarily “vindicat[ing] the economic, rather than the personal, rights 
of authors.”212 
The first-sale doctrine represents perhaps the most serious 
impediment to the enforcement of a public-presentation right outside 
of the scope of VARA.213 Found in § 109 of the 1976 Copyright Act, 
the first-sale doctrine is named for its effect in “sharply curtail[ing]” 
the § 106(3) right to distribute copies by eliminating that right in its 
entirety after the first sale of the work.214 More relevant to the issue of 
display rights is § 109(1), which reads: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(5), the owner of a 
particular copy lawfully made under this title, or any person 
authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the 
copyright owner, to display that copy publicly, either directly or by 
the projection of no more than one image at a time, to viewers present 
at the place where the copy is located.215 
Because of this section’s allocation of the right to display the work to 
the work’s owner, an artist’s attempt to use an alternate copyright 
theory to enjoin the display of a modified or distorted work will fail. 
CONCLUSION 
Given that the rise in respect and value of works by contemporary 
American artists prompted, in part, the eventual adoption of VARA, 
it is ironic that the very elements which distinguished those works from 
those of earlier movements remain largely unprotected by the 
American moral-rights scheme. Only through expansion of the right of 
integrity to encompass issues of display as potentially prohibited 
modifications will the interests of American contemporary artists be 
adequately secured. However, the public-presentation exception 
threatens more than just the personal interests of artists—a greater 
societal interest in preserving authentic cultural heritage for future 
generations is continually undermined as long as the public-
presentation exception remains codified in VARA.  
 
 
 212. VerSteeg, supra note 192, at 833 (quoting Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 23). 
 213. Brooks, supra note 70, at 1447 (“[The first-sale doctrine] is the most serious impediment 
to copyright protection for the moral rights of . . . creators of singular works of art.”). 
 214. Id. 
 215. 17 U.S.C. § 109(1) (2012). 
